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be suggested that Qadhafi's political theory is part of a tradition of radical democratic thought initiated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and that the source of Qadhafi's ideas is the Social Contract, as the similarities between them are unmistakable.1 Indeed, there is a sense in which it can be argued that Qadhafi is implementing in Libya what Rousseau once proposed for Corsica, a nation which he deemed potentially capable of expressing 'the general will'.2 It should also be noted that Qadhafi did not come to power on the basis of his jamahiriya ideas, but that these were formulated during the first seven years of his rule. Clear evidence exists, however, that Qadhafi believed in a concept of popular sovereignty, and in the people's authority, from the very first when he assumed power in I969, but that this was not then a mature theory. On the Arab front, and in pursuit of the slogan of unity, Libya joined with Syria and Egypt in an attempt to unite themselves in the Federation of Arab Republics (20 August 1970). This, as well as other attempts at Arab unity, particularly with Egypt, were a failure for which Qadhafi blamed President Sadat. Domestically, the R.C.C. sought to directly involve the Libyan masses in the programmes of the revolution by organising them into a Nasser-style Arab Socialist Union which was an alliance of working people. The limited success of the R.C.C., however, led Qadhafi to announce (7 October 1971) that in September of that year he had offered his resignation in protest against 'bureaucratic inertia' and public apathy towards his revolutionary programme. In hindsight, this signalled a trend towards the ultimate transfer of power to the people. However, they had to be made ready for this trust. I 84 tunity of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday anniversary on 15 April 1973 to declare certain drastic measures to preserve the revolution. He proposed: (i) the abrogation of all 'reactionary laws'; (ii) the purging of the politically sick and the deviants who represented counterrevolutionary forces (communists, capitalists, and the Muslim Brotherhood); (iii) the distribution of weapons to the revolutionary masses; (iv) the undertaking of a bureaucratic and administrative revolution; and (v) the declaration of a cultural revolution.1 These five measures were to become the pillars upon which the basic concepts of the Green Book were to be erected.
Following the speech, in June 1973, 450 people's committees were formed and took control over the national administration, universities, hospitals, schools, factories, and farms.2 A form of direct democracy had emerged, and the next logical step was for the leader to provide his people with a succinct theoretical justification for the experiment.
On 6 April I974, it was reported that Qadhafi had been relieved of his 'political, administrative, and traditional duties'.' Naturally this led to speculation about a power change in Libya. The fact, however, was that Qadhafi was assuming a new role within the system, that of its theoretician and leader of the revolution.4 By 1976, the 'theoretician' Qadhafi published part one of the Green Book, and Libya was almost ready to launch the new era ofjamahiriya. Qadhafi's assertion incorporates all the points associated with the assertion of Rousseau. His view of human political history is equally pessimistic in that he believes all existing governments represent the monopoly of power by one form or another over alternative types. An 'instrument of governing' establishes in society the interest of an individual, a group, a political party, or a class. It does so because, historically, such an instrument has always been victorious in the game of power politics. The outcome, in Rousseau's terms, is that it chains the rest of the populace. In Qadhafi's terms it 'defeats genuine democracy', a defeat that need not be accepted. The reason it need not be accepted can be deduced from what genuine democracy implies.
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Genuine or direct democracy implies the equality of men, and based on this equality it implies the right of every man to govern himself. Qadhafi's belief in the equality of man is further manifest in his statement that 'Man is the same everywhere. His physical constitution is the same and so is his instinct.' (p. 32). This equality of men, also implied in Rousseau's assertion, has a levelling effect that by definition makes any government a negation of equality since it presents us with the dichotomy of rulers versus the ruled. It also negates man's freedom to govern himself directly. Hence, in so far as man need not accept any existing form of government, but rather should assert his right to directly govern himself, Qadhafi's assertion is revolutionary. Again, the problem for politics is to find an alternative to the despotism of government.
The Problem: the State of Nature and the Instruments of Governing
Rousseau's basic assertion logically led him to an enquiry into the origins of political society. This emerged, at least theoretically, from the state of nature, through the mechanism of a social contract. The rights that men possess in the state of nature are not, however, the grounds upon which a political society is established. In the early chapters of Book I (i-v), Rousseau identifies two main rights of nature: the right of a father who can, because of the natural bond between him and his children, command them; and the right of the strongest, who commands obedience by virtue of his force. But, neither of these natural rights can be transferred into a political right -'that is, a legitimate reason for obeying a government and laws '. In the case of the father's right, the bond between him and his children naturally dissolves itself as they cease to need him, after which the bond between them is maintained voluntarily, not naturally.2 Likewise, the right of the strongest is not the basis of political right, for 'Yielding to force is an act of necessity, not will' (I, iii). Obligation is not freely tendered to the strongest; it is, by virtue of the fact of his force, extracted by him.
Through this process of elimination, Rousseau concludes that 'Since no man has any natural authority over his fellow man, and since force produces no right, there remain only conventions as the basis of all legitimate authority among men' (I, iv). The exception to this is that a people cannot, through a convention, enslave themselves to a government, for 'To renounce one's freedom is to renounce one's status as a man, the rights of humanity and even its duties' (I, iv).
The state of nature was a condition of absolute independence and happiness. However, for some reasons not clearly identified, it could 'no longer subsist and the human race would perish if it did not change its way of life' (I, vi).3 The alternative was to 'find a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before' (I, vi) . This is what the social contract produces. It is used by Rousseau to explain the origin of political society, and the significance of the contractual theory from this point on is downgraded, because 'his true interest is not the contract, which is rapidly passed over, but the general will, in the existence of which he finds the essential characteristic of the state. hypothetical state of nature and, noting its threats to the human race, his discussion leads directly to his ideal political community erected on the basis of the concept of the general will -to be brought about by the social contract, whose basis is man's rational deliberation.
Existing instruments of governing considered by Qadhafi include those of parliaments, party, class, and plebiscites. All of these forms have created a political problem for man in the modern society. The first three alternatives falsify genuine democracy by placing power in the hands of a societal group smaller than society at large -i.e. a system of representation. Of these three, parliaments are the least democratic, for the members either have no 'organizational link with the electors' (p. Io), or they represent some form of a coalition or party which itself is only a small fraction of society. Furthermore, elected parliaments are based on a system of propaganda and thus are 'a demagogic system in the real sense of the word' (p. I I), while appointed parliaments, or those based on heredity succession, are dismissed as not falling under any form of democracy.
A party is also undemocratic for two reasons. First, society as a whole is by definition 'pluralistic' and is characterised by 'the diversity of interests, ideas, temperaments, localities and beliefs' (p. I4); while a party is composed of 'people who have common interests, a common outlook, or a common culture, or who belong to the same locality or have the same belief' (p. I3). A party, in a society, is a minority, and its rule is by definition undemocratic. Secondly, a party is a victim of the iron law of oligarchy in that while its original intent is to represent the people, a party hierarchy emerges along with a system ofmanoeuvres, tricks, and political games. The result is the rule of the very few, and Qadhafi concludes that the party system is the 'dictatorship of the modern age'.
According to the Green Book, an aggregation of economic interests, such as the type mostly found in industrial/capitalist societies, or a tribal coalition, such as those prevalent in Third-World nations, is 'better than a party coalition because the people consist originally of a group of tribes. One seldom finds people who do not belong to a tribe, and all people belong to a certain class' (p. I 9). But, although a tribe or a class is more representative of the whole people than a party or a parliament, they nevertheless fall short of representing the whole of society which is made up of a multitude of parts. With respect to the Marxist concept of class, Qadhafi points out that 'if the working class crushes all other classes, for instance, it becomes heir of the society, that is, it becomes the material and social base of the society. The heir bears the traits of the one he inherits from, though they may not be evident at once' (p. 20). Additionally, 'the working class turns out to be a separate society, showing the same contradictions as the old society' (pp. 20-1). Hence, for Qadhafi, history repeats itself, and 'the struggle for domination of society starts again' (p. 21). Indeed, Qadhafi adheres to the proposition that if the single material base of society becomes the instrument of governing, this situation may lead to a temporary stability only to collapse before new material and social standards that are bound to emerge from the original base. He states: 'Any society with class conflict was in the past a one-class society but, due to inevitable evolution, the conflicting class emerged from that one class' (p. 21). Clearly, this position denies the Marxist hypothesis that the dictatorship of the proletariat ushers in the end of class society.
Plebiscites, or referendums, raise political problems of a different nature. While these mechanisms, employed by some modern instruments of governing, permit participants to voice their approval or disapproval regarding a specific measure on the ballot, they do not allow the individual to make clear what he wants, and the reasons for his approval or disapproval. In other words, the individual is denied the opportunity through his arguments for or against a specific measure to influence the opinions of others -a denial of a basic democratic right.
Existing instruments of governing not only pose political problems, their threat goes beyond that, so that people today 'suffer from various risks and grave consequences'. Even the family institution is affected, so that 'the conflict within the family is, often, the result of this problem [of existing instruments of governing]' (p. 7). Although Qadhafi does not specify what exactly are these 'risks' and grave 'consequences' facing the human community, they can be taken to mean that the fabric of society is being threatened in ways more than just political. Faced with these challenges, Qadhafi concludes that 'the people have the right to struggle, through the popular revolution, to destroy instruments which usurp democracy and sovereignty and take them away from the masses' (p. io). It is this popular revolution, then, which will bring about the new age, that of genuine democracy based on the concept ofjamahiriya and its instrument, the Third Universal Theory, which is the 'final theoretical solution to the problem of the instrument of governing' (p. 7).1
While this discussion reveals some differences between Rousseau and Qadhafi, it points out some important fundamental similarities in their logics. Their main differences lie in the fact that Rousseau views the threat to the human race in historical terms, in that this occurred in man's distant past in the state of nature. To Qadhafi, the danger is more immediate and present. Also, to Rousseau, the nature of the threat is somewhat vague or else physical in character; to Qadhafi it is more specific, although largely political. In addition, Rousseau regards the social contract as the instrument by which the threat is met. To Qadhafi, the threat is to be met by the popular revolution. On the other hand, the similarities between them are more subtle than apparent. For both writers, there is an urgent necessity to restore (for Rousseau) and to correct (for Qadhafi) the human condition. Men must then act, either to form a social contract, or to wage a popular revolution, in order to avert the threat to themselves. In other words, history must be controlled by the action of men. In Machiavelli's terms, such action is a virtue which is inversely related to fortune or fate and which is consistent with necessity.
During the celebrations of the sixth anniversary of the September Revolution ('975), Qadhafi declared that the 'Revolution is not permanent. It is a passage from a state of underdevelopment to a more progressive one; from what it is to what it should be.'1 From this quotation we can note another important similarity between Rousseau and Qadhafi, namely that the significance of the instruments for change -i.e. the social contract and the popular revolution -is downgraded by them, as their main interests are focused on the creation of mass sovereignty through the general will and the Third Universal Theory. It can then be stated that while Rousseau and Qadhafi differ on the particulars, the thrust of their arguments as to the nature of the problem, how, and why it should be solved, are fundamentally identical.
The Solution: the General Will and the Third Universal Theory
For Rousseau, the civil society or civitas, which was created by the social contract, does not itself institute a sovereign; rather the people, in acting to create, through the social contract, the civil society, become themselves sovereign, and will always continue to be so. Hence, the concept of popular sovereignty, and the general will is what expresses that sovereignty.2 Similarly, the people, through the popular revolution, in Qadhafi's thought seek the destruction of an instrument of governing, not to replace it with another, but to institute themselves as sovereign and to remain so. This is what jamahiriya means, and the Third Universal Theory is what expresses that jamahiriya or popular sovereignty. Now the concept needs no explanation. Suffice it to say that the people in the management of their public affairs are those who directly, and without any intermediary, propose, dispose, and impose. In other words, they are to practise genuine democracy.
Students of political theory are aware of the significance as well as the highly controversial nature of the concept of the general will in the annals of political thought. As noted above, the Third Universal Theory seeks to solve the problems associated with this problematic concept. Fundamentally, this is the meaning of Qadhafi's statement that 'The Green Book represents the theoretical solution to the problem of the instrument of governing.'
For Rousseau, as soon as the social compact is concluded and popular sovereignty is established, then ' Instantly, in place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life, and its will' (I, vi). The general will then is the will of the collective body politic, and is something more than the mere sum total of the individual wills that make up the collective body politic. To this sovereign general will Rousseau ascribes the attributes of being infallible (II, iii), inalienable (II, i), indivisible (II, ii), and indestructible (IV, i). These attributes are explicit in Qadhafi's concept ofjamahiriya and its expression through the Third Universal Theory.
The sovereign is infallible in that 'the general will is always right and always tends towards the public utility'. Likewise,jamahiriya, 'if realised in practice, is indisputable and non-controversial' (p. 28). The exercise ofjamahiriya cannot, therefore, result in error, for dispute and controversy arise about things that are questionable.
The attribute of inalienability means that it 'can only be represented by itself', precisely whatjamahiriya implies as being a direct democracy. Additionally, this means that sovereignty cannot be transferred to a public institution such as government. The sovereign and the government can never be the same thing. Again, this is the doctrine ofjamahiriya, whereby government in its traditional conception has been replaced with the people's authority expressed through their popular congresses and committees.
Because sovereignty is inalienable, it is for the same reason indivisible: 'either the will is general or it is not'. What Rousseau is concerned about here is that sovereignty has been assumed to be divided 'into legislative 194 SAMI G. HAJJAR power and executive power; into rights of taxation, justice, and war', etcetera (II, ii). To him, the social body cannot be separated into parts. The source of the general will is the same, although its acts could be directed towards several objects. The same concern is manifest in Qadhafi's Third Universal Theory, whereby because 'sovereignty (jamahiriya) of the people is indivisible' (p. 16), the people are not only organised into congresses, but also into administrative committees whose primary function is to replace the governmental administration. The people, therefore, dictate and implement their own policies.
Thus, both the administration and the supervision become popular and the outdated definition of democracy as the supervision of the government by the people, comes to an end. It will be replaced by the right definition:
DEMOCRACY IS THE SUPERVISION OF THE PEOPLE BY THE PEOPLE (p. 28).
Sovereignty then is indivisible. The fourth attribute of indestructibility was deduced by Rousseau from his discussion of the 'degeneration' of the state:
When the State, close to its ruin, continues to subsist only in an illusory and ineffectual form; when the social bond is broken in all hearts; when the basest interest brazenly adopts the sacred name of the public good, then the general will becomes mute. This, however, does not mean that the general will has been annihilated or corrupted: 'No, it is always constant, unalterable, and pure' (IV, i). Consequently, it follows that the salvation of a degenerate state is to rediscover the general will. The same logic and conclusion, that sovereignty (jamahiriya) is indestructible, is explicit in the Green Book when Qadhafi discusses how society readjusts its direction in the case of deviation from its laws. Thus, for Qadhafi, If a deviation from society's law takes places under this system, it indicates a complete departure that should be dealt with comprehensively through a democratic revision rather than by force. This is not a process of voluntary choice of the method of change or of treatment; rather it is an inevitable result of the nature of such a democratic system (p. 37).
It also follows here that because of the nature of the democratic system whose sovereignty is, in Rousseau's words, 'always constant, unalterable and pure', the cure for the deviation is built into the democratic system itself so that a 'voluntary choice of the method of change or treatment' does not exist.
From this discussion it is evident that Qadhafi and Rousseau attribute to popular sovereignty the same characteristics. They, however, part company from this point onwards. The reason is that the further development and implications of Rousseau's thought has produced a I95 number of problems that Qadhafi's Third Universal Theory attempts to deal with.
The further development of Rousseau's thought, given the characteristics of the general will and its centrality to the concept of popular sovereignty, has to do with the practical problem of how to make the general will operational in the body politic. This issue leads him to the following main conclusions. First, the general will has to be exercised in a popular assembly, whereby each citizen is to deliberate and vote. As a result, the body politic had to be sufficiently small to permit the assembly of the whole people, because 'in general, democratic government is suited to small states' (III, iii). Rousseau's preference then is a state similar to the ancient Greek city-state orpolis. This is incongruent with the realities of the modern nation-state.
Secondly, given the distinction between the general and the particular will, Rousseau is led to the conclusion that 'the smaller the number of individuals and the more similar their situation, the less the " friction" or contradiction between private interests and their common interests'.' Organisations, such as unions, syndicates, or professional groups, should not exist, and if they do, then the more numerous they are the less the general will is endangered. Similarly, this proposition is not in tune with the complex reality of modern societies which are made up of pluralistic interests.
Thirdly, since the general will is the only legitimate source of all legislation in society, being always right and always tending towards public utility, and since 'it does not follow that the peoples' deliberations always have the same rectitude' (II, iii), how, then, is the general will to be discerned, and how can the people's deliberations be made to have, in the majority of cases, the same rectitude? The answer is found in Rousseau's concept of the 'legislator' and of the 'civil religion'. The former is some special person who, unlike the ordinary citizen, can somehow always know what the general will is; the latter, on the other hand, has the impact of diverting the citizens from their selfish interests and to focus on the common interests. Its effect is to make citizens virtuous, so that in their deliberations they are guided by a fundamental common moral code. It is these concepts that give despotic tones to Rousseau's theory.
How does Qadhafi's Third Universal Theory deal with these issues? The organisational arrangements proposed, as enumerated earlier, are designed to overcome the first two limitations of Rousseau's conclusions. On the one hand, the procedure of organising the people into basic popular congresses in each of the country's districts, supported by People's Congress in the same manner, the theory overcomes Rousseau's second conclusion in so far as the organisational procedure incorporates the pluralistic nature and interests of contemporary society. As for Rousseau's third conclusion, while Qadhafi likewise rejects the idea of a constitution in a system of popular sovereignty,1 the Libyan leader recognises that a society has fundamental laws derived from either tradition or religion. This is what constitutes the moral code for a society that would direct the people in their practice of self-government so that the need for a man-made civil religion, for instance, is avoided. Furthermore, nowhere in the Green Book is there a reference to any individual similar to the 'legislator'. In fact, the opposite is true. Anyone who has 'the initiative and boldness to proclaim the will of the society', opens 'the way to dictatorship' (p. 36). Since Qadhafi has relinquished all previously held titles and positions, limiting himself to that of the Leader of the Revolution; and since this is a passing, not a permanent, stage of development, eventually the people are completely left on their own to practice pure democracy. The Third Universal Theory is, therefore, an attempt to avoid the kinds of paradoxes that plagued Rousseau's theory.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The brief historical survey of the Libyan revolution, the stated intent of its leader Qadhafi, its accomplishments in politically reorganising Libya, and the comparative analysis between Qadhafi's political thought and that of Rousseau, leave no doubt that Qadhafi is a Rousseauan. He is so in two distinct and somewhat contradictory ways.
There is first the 'thinker' Qadhafi of the Green Book, who not only adopts the general will concept in the form ofjamahiriya, but who by virtue of having mastered Rousseau's thought, proposes the Third Universal Theory to overcome its limitations, and to make his ideas viable in the contemporary world. To Qadhafi, it seems, the validity and importance of the substance of Rousseau's ideas (the general will concept) as a solution to the world's basic political problem (freedom) cannot be dismissed because of its limitations, conceived as minor procedural problems. The Third Universal Theory, then, could be no more than a simplistic organisational arrangement to deal with difficulties of procedure. Viewed as such, Qadhafi cannot be regarded as a follower-revisionist of Rousseau as some of Marx's followers were, but a modern reincarnation of him.
There is, secondly, the 'ruler' Qadhafi, albeit with the seemingly innocuous title of the Leader of the Revolution, which enables him to patory democracy is not how to run it but how to reach it'.1 This proposition is then immediately qualified, and he suggests that in some Third-World countries, in contra-distinction to western liberal democracies, 'the road had already been travelled: I mean the road away from capitalist class-division and bourgeois ideology towards, in the one case, a Marxist humanism and, in the other, a Rousseauan concept of a society embodying a general will'.2 MacPherson argues that as a prerequisite to reaching participatory democracy it is not only the problem of size that must be resolved; the image of man as a consumer must be replaced by that of an exerter (who enjoys his exertion and develops his own capacities), and there must also be a reduction of social and economic inequalities.3
All of these problems, at least theoretically, have been addressed by Qadhafi. I have elaborated on how the problem of size has been tackled by the Third Universal Theory. The economic version in Part II of the Green Book preaches the slogan of' partners not wage earners', with the net effect of transforming earner-consumers to partner-producers who are rewarded to the extent of their exertion.4 In addition, by advocating socialism to meet the problem of economic need, Qadhafi seeks to resolve the issue of economic inequality. He writes, 'In a socialist society, there is no possibility for private production exceeding the satisfaction of individual needs, because satisfaction of needs at the expense of others is not allowed'.5 As for social inequalities, they are dealt with in Part III of the Green Book. For example, 'a minority has its own social rights. Any encroachment on these rights by any majority is an act of injustice'.6 Or, in the case of women, 'Discrimination between man and woman is a flagrant act of oppression without any justification',7 although differentiation of sex roles is permitted so long as they can be justified in terms of natural law -for example, the maternal role.
In light of the fact that the new political, economic, and social arrangements are based on the teachings of the Green Book, and that these are being imposed and watched over by their 'Legislator', the question is not how can Libya reach participatory democracy; rather, it is how to run thejamahiriya, and how it has been run. As of now, no definitive answers are available. Two final and general observations can, however, be made.
On the negative side, it is relevant to mention that the overwhelming majority of individuals managing the system of jamahiriya are young adults. By its very nature, participatory democracy requires a high level of public involvement, a demand being met by the younger elements of the Libyan population. If this observation implies that the middleaged and older citizens are either incapable of meeting the requirements of participation, or that they prefer to be ruled rather than take on the burden of self-management, then the system's longevity would depend on the enthusiasm of the youth which must be kept high at all times -a precarious condition.
On the positive side, there is the fact that Libya is a very rich nation, with one of the world's highest incomes per capita. This means that popular congresses and committees are capable of translating their decisions into actions, as witnessed by the massive construction and development programmes now taking place in Libya. But in view of the insistence of the universality of the doctrine of jamahiriya, one wonders whether such a system could run in a poor nation, where participatory democracy could hardly be anything more than an exercise in frustration. Consequently, the Libyanjamahiriya experiment is, in my view, a luxury that few nations, if any, can afford. It would be foolish social science to offer any future predictions.
